Volume 25

Issue 1

Article 10

November 1917

Has the West Virginia Workmen's Compensation Act Any
Extraterritorial Operation?
T. P. H.
West Virginia University College of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr
Part of the Workers' Compensation Law Commons

Recommended Citation
T. P. H., Has the West Virginia Workmen's Compensation Act Any Extraterritorial Operation?, 25 W. Va. L.
Rev. (1917).
Available at: https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol25/iss1/10

This Editorial Note is brought to you for free and open access by the WVU College of Law at The Research
Repository @ WVU. It has been accepted for inclusion in West Virginia Law Review by an authorized editor of The
Research Repository @ WVU. For more information, please contact ian.harmon@mail.wvu.edu.

H.: Has the West Virginia Workmen's Compensation Act Any Extraterrito
EDITORIAL NOTES

suretyship that no affirmative duty should be imposed upon the
creditor for the benefit of the surety by law where the surety has
power to protect himself. In West Virginia and Virginia the
surety is given additional power of self-protection by the statutes
previously referred to.'
Thus, mere laches or delay in suing the
principal, where there is no binding agreement extending time
or releasing the principal, will not discharge the surety 9 because
it is unnecessary for the law to impose such obligation for the
surety's protection. For the same reason the law should not impose a duty on a creditor to sue the principal first in the absence
of an express agreement.
-H. C. J.
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recent West Virginia decision' raises the question whether the West Virginia Act extends
to injuries sustained beyond the state's territorial jurisdiction.
The claimant's husband was fatally injured while "shooting" an
oil well in the state of Kentucky. His employer had complied with
the West Virginia Workmen's Compensation Act; but as there
is nothing in the Act expressly extending its operation to injuries
sustained in other jurisdictions, whereas § 25 provides2 that the
Compensation Commissioner shall disburse the compensation fund
to certain employes "which employes shall have received injuries
in this state," the Commissioner therefore decided that the West
Virginia* Act has "no extraterritorial effect to cover injuries occurring without the state." The Supreme Court of Appeals, reversing the Commissioner's order, held that the Act, notwithstanding the apparently contrary meaning of § 25, is not confined to
"injuries received in this state."
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, construing the
Massachusetts Act, which in this respect is almost identical with
the West Virginia Act, has recently reached a conclusion contrary
EXTRATERRITORIAL

OPERATION?-A

Is See note 9, supra.

191Renick v. Ludington, 14 W. Va. 367, 383; Knight -v. Charter, 22 W. Va. 422,
427; First Nat. Bank v. Parsons, 45 W. Va. 688, 698, 32 S. E. 271; Norris v. Crlmmey, 2 Rand. 323, 334 (Va. 1824) ; Updike's Adm'r. v. Lane, 78 Va. 132 (28
years delay).
'Foughty v. Ott, 92 S._E. 143 (W. Va. 1917).
2W.Va. Code, c. 15P, § 25.
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to that'reached in the principal case.3 The question then arises,
whether the Massachusetts case or the West Virginia case represents the better rule.
It is well settled that the legislature of a state has the power to
extend the benefits of its Compensation Act to injuries occurring
beyond its territorial confines.4 The question, therefore, in every
ease is simply this: Does the language of the particular legislative
enactment, when properly construed, cover injuries occurring in
other jurisdictions? In order to settle this question-a question
of construction-it is of course necessary to consult the exact
language of the Act.
What then are the provisions of the West Virginia Act which
have any legitimate bearing upon this question? First, § 25 provides that "the Commissioner shall disburse the workmen's compensation fund to the employes of such employers as have" complied with the Act "and which employes shall have received injuries in this state in the course of and resulting from their employment." It would seem difficult to use language more unequivocally indicative of an intention to confine the Act to "injuries
received in this state." If, therefore, there is nothing in the Act
clearly indicating an intention to extend the Act to injuries not
"received in this state," then it would seem clear that the ruling
of the Commissioner was correct, viz. that the Act has no extraterritorial effect.
Let us see then what language of the Act the court relies upon
as not only contradicting but overruling the apparently unambiguous meaning of § 25. The opinion in the principal case is
simply a brief reaffirmance of exactly the same point decided by
the same court in Gooding v. Ott,5 in which case the principal statutory provision relied upon as destroying the prima facie meaning of § 25 -is § 9. The last-named sections provides that the "Act
shall not apply to ......
.. employes of any employer who
are employed wholly without the state." This provision the court
interprets as "admitting employes to the benefits of the fund un3 In re American Mut. Liability Ins. Co., 215 Mass. 480, 102 N. E. 693, Ann. Cas.
1914D 372.
For a citation of authorities dealing with similar statutes, see 1
BRADBURY, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION, 2 ed. 34 et seq; 1 HoNNOLD, WORKMEN'S
COMPENSATION,

§ .8.

LMulhall v. Fallon, 176 Mass. 266, 57 N. E. 386, 54 L. R. A. 934; Gooding
v. Ott, 87 S. E. 862 (W. Va. 1916) ; see 1 BRADBURY, WORN N'S COMPENSATION, 2
-ed. 34 et seq; 1 HONNOLD, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION, § 8.
'87 S. E. 862 (W. Va. 1916).
6W. Va. Code, c. 15P, § 9.
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less employed wholly without the state. ' 7 That is undoubtedly
so as to cases coming within the Act, but § 25 seems to say that no
-ease comes within the Act unless the injuries are "received in
this state." Section 9 then, it would seem, can only mean that if
-employes are employed wholly without the state the Act can never
apply to them, whereas if they are not employed wholly without
the state but only partly without the state, then the Act shall
apply to them, provided, of course, that the other provisions of
the Act are complied with and do not prevent recovery, for certainly the other sections of the Act must also be complied with in
•all cases and § 25 does not mean what it says unless it confines
awards to employes who "shall have received injuries in this
-state." Moreover, that the Commissioner's construction of the
Act carries out the intended meaning of the Act seems to appear
-even more fully from the language of several other sections. Thus
§ 52 (which is not mentioned by the court) reads as follows:
"In case any employer within the meaning of this Act is also
engaged in interstate or foreign commerce this Act shall apply to
"tim only to the extent that his mutual connection with work in this
.state is clearly separable and distinguishable from his interstate
work, and in such case such employer, and any of his employes
thus engaged in both intrastate and interstate work may with the
approval of the Commissioner elect to pay into the fund the premiums provided by this Act on account of work done in his state
only ..
.........
..
Payments of premiums shall be on
the basis of the payroll of the employes who accept as aforesaid,
for work done in this state only." From this language nothing
would seem to be clearer than that in case an employer is engaged
in interstate commerce the Act does not apply except as to "work
done in this state only," and therefore almost necessarily as to
"injuries received in this state" only, for injuries not received in
this state could seldom be received in respect of "work done in
this state only" and therefore would not be "injuries received in
the course of the employment" as required by § 25, for the employment covered by § 52 of the Act is "work done in this state only."
At any rate in the principal case the injury did not "result from"
-'work done in this state only." Now, so far as any federal ob5ections are concerned, any objection to extending a state compensation act to "interstate commerce" work done in another
state applies with equal force to "interstate commerce" "work done
7Gooding v. Ott, sUpra, at 863.
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in this state only." 8 Then, too, there has been some difference of
opinion as to whether and how far a state workmen's compensation act may govern employers and employes engaged in interstate commerce." The purpose of the section, therefore, seems to
be to remove any doubts as to whether and how far the West Virginia Act is intended to apply to interstate commerce transactions;
and as there is just the same federal objection both as to interstate commerce "work done in this state" and such work done
elsewhere, the section, therefore, seems to be simply indicative of
a general scheme of the Act to confine its operation to the state's
territorial limits. Otherwise, why confine its operation in interstate commerce transactions to intrastate activities? Unfortunately, however, this section of the Act does not seem to have been
brought to the attention of the court.
The second argument of the court is as follows: "By the
amendment [in 1915] of § 18 there was omitted that provision of
the original act, authorizing the employer, where an employe was
employed partly within and partly without the state, to apportion
the pay of such employe earned within and without the state in
ascertaining the percentage of wages to be paid into the compensation fund .......
.. By the amendment omitting this provision an employer cannot now, on penalty of losing the entire
benefit of the Act deduct any proportion of the wages of an employe earned without the state." The court, however, has evidently overlooked the above quoted § 52 which expressly provides
for such apportionment in interstate commerce transactions. Besides, how can this amendment mean that the legislature intended
thereby to extend the Act so as to cover injuries sustained in other
states? The legislature does not say so, and it would seem that it
expressly says the opposite in § 25. Did the legislature, then, in
passing the amendment intend such a result? The legislature may
have had other reasons, and it is submitted that there is another
more plausible reason-a reason stated by the court itself, viz.
"employers and commissioner may have found it difficult under
the original act to apportion the wages so as to determine the
proper amount of premiums to be paid." That difficulty is very
great in some cases, and, it would seem, is in itself sufficient to
account for the legislative amendment. If that is true, it would
seem then that, if a provision in a statute has an ambiguous mean8See I HozNOL,

WOmrmEN'S CoMPENSATION, § 10.

See 1 HoNNozx, WOnxmEN's COMPNSATION, 45 et
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ing, sound principles of construction would require an adoption
of that meaning which would prevent overriding other unambiguous provisions. Moreover, that the above mentioned meaning of
the amendment is the intended meaning seems to be borne out
by the above quoted § 52, for by that section where in interstate
commerce transactions the intrastate work is not "clearly separable and distinguishable from the interstate work" of the same
employer, the Act does not apply even as to intrastate work for
the obvious reason of the great difficulty of apportioning wages
and premiums.
With the exception of § 52, which is not mentioned by the court,
the above considered sections of the Act are the only sections relied upon by the court as overruling the prima facie meaning of
§ 25. There are other provisions, however, which, it would seem,
have a legitimate bearing upon the question. Thus, the Act contemplates and provides for "hearings," "investigations," "physical examinations and inspections"' 1 at other places than at tL.e
Commissioner's office. These of course would involve "investigations" as to the circumstances surrounding the employe at the
time and place of injury, etc. and also "physical examinations"
of the injured employe which for practical reasons must as a
rule be near the place of injury. The fact that in the principal
ease the accident causing the death of the employe happened only
a few miles beyond the state's territorial jurisdiction is immaterial. The principle would be the-same if the accident had happened in China, and the legislature could scarcely have contemplated sending its officials into another jurisdiction to make "investigations" and "examinations."
Besides § 6 expressly provides that the "hearings" may be "anywhere within the state."
Again § 12 empowers the commissioner and "every inspector and
examiner" to "take depositions, issue subpeonas and compel the
attendance of witnesses and the production of pertinent books,
accounts and testimony."
But this section could not well contemplate such action as to injuries sustained beyond the state's
territorial jurisdiction, for the witnesses, etc. would generally
be from near the place of accident, and the "subpoenas" issued
by state authority could not of course run beyond the limits of
the state's territorial jurisdiction.
The net result, then, seems to be that there are no expressions
in the Act which unequivocally indicate an intention to extend
1oW. Va. Code, c. 15P, 11 6. 8.
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its operation to injuries sustained in other jurisdictions, whereas
§ 25 does expressly say that the fund shall be distributed to certain employes "which employes shall have received injuries in
this state;" and not only are there no other expressions in the
Act which are by necessary implication inconsistent with the view
that the Act has no extraterritorial effect but there are, as seen,
several other sections that do not readily lend themselves to the
view that the Act contemplates any extraterritorial operation.
What then should be the conclusion? It is a fundamental principle of statutory construction that each part of an act should
be construed, if possible, so as not to conflict with, but give effect
to, each other part.1 But the court's construction of §§ 9 and 18
seems to render nugatory a vital part of § 25. It would seem, also,
from the foregoing observations that the provisions of the act
relied upon as overriding the apparently unambiguous meaning of
§ 25 are, at most, only "ambiguous," being susceptible of a meaning other than that accorded by the court and that too a plausible
meaning which is in accord with the express language of § 25.
It would seem, therefore, that settled principles of construction
would lead to an adoption of that plausible meaning of the ambiguous provisions which would prevent doing violence to the language of an unambiguous provision, especially since that construction is by the language of another section the only possible construction as to one sort of interstate transactions, viz. interstate
commerce, and more especially since that construction would not
only obviate the many practical difficulties resulting from giving
the Act an extraterritorial operation but would at the same time
carry out a general scheme of the Act as a harmonious whole.12
-T. P. H.
"Jackson v. Kittle, 34 W. Va. 207, 12 S. E. 484; Argand Refining Co. V. Quinn,
39 W. Va. 535, 20 S. E. 576; see 2 Lwis" SUTnEaLAN, STATuToay CONSTRUCTION,
2 ed. § 380.
By way of an appendix to the above comment it may perhaps be appropriately
added that under the peculiar facts of the principal case there is another, though
collateral argument in favor of limiting the operation of the Act to injuries sustained in this state. Thus, § 52, above considered, provides that in case an employer is engaged in interstate commerce the Act shall not apply except as to
"work done in this state only." The interesting question then arises-a question
not mentioned in the case: Was the employer of the injured workman engaged in
interstate commerce? The facts seem to be these: The employer was a corporation
engaged in the business of "manufacturing nitroglycerin and shooting oil and gas
wells."
Its factory was in West Virginia but it was engaged in "shooting" wells
both in West Virginia and in Kentucky. Query, then, wasn't the transaction, under
which nitroglycerin was by one company manufactured in West Virginia and
transported into another state to be there used by it in "shooting" an oil well for
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